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of the authors and do not necessary represent the views of the Local
Government and Public Service Reform Initiative.
Pawel Swianiewicz is currently a professor at the Centre for European
Regional and Local Studies (EUROREG) of Warsaw University, where
he teaches several courses relating to local government. After complet-
ing his doctorate in  Economic Geography (1989), he spent 5 months
in 1991 as a research fellow at the School for Advanced Urban Studies,
University of Bristol. In 1992/1993 he was a senior Fulbright scholar at
Department of Sociology, University of Chicago. From 1995 to 2000
he worked as a manager of the British Know How Fund Local Govern-
ment Assistance Programme in Poland. In 1998 he obtained a Ph.D. in
Economics at Poznan Economic Academy.
Prof. Swianiewicz’s research interests focus on local governments and
their financial and economic policies, as well as on comparative analy-
sis of local politics. Since 1991 he has been involved in several inter-
national research projects on local governments and local government
reforms, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He
currently coordinates the Polish research team working in the “Partici-
pation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability” Project (PLUS) under the
EU Fifth Framework Programme. He has also been involved in consul-
tancy for central and local governments in several countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Alba-
nia). Prof. Swianiewicz has authored or edited fifteen books, over forty
articles published in English, and over fifty articles published in Polish
or other languages. 
e-mail address: pswian@mercury.ci.uw.edu.pl
vii
Acknowledgment
I would like to express my gratitude to Gábor Péteri for his very care-
ful review of the manuscript and several valuable suggestions that helped
to improve the structure and clarity of arguments in this paper. The
author, however, remains solely responsible for any errors or arguments
presented. 
ix
Table of contents
Abstract ...................................................................................................... xi
1. Why local government is useful and why it should provide services ..................... 1
1.1 Values in local government and decentralization........................................... 1
1.2 Justification for local public spending ........................................................... 2
2. Criteria for revenue and expenditure assignment .................................................. 4
2.1 Allocation of local functions.......................................................................... 5
2.2 Local government revenues........................................................................... 6
3. Local own source revenue................................................................................... 10
3.1. Local taxes ................................................................................................. 10
3.1.1 Basic principles of local taxation ........................................................ 10
3.1.2 Local taxes in the practice of European countries............................... 12
3.1.3 Local taxes in Poland ......................................................................... 16
3.2 Other revenues from own sources............................................................... 19
4. Shared revenues.................................................................................................. 20
5. Grants................................................................................................................. 22
5.1 Reasons for grants ....................................................................................... 22
5.2 Types of grants ........................................................................................... 23
5.3 Types of equalization .................................................................................. 26
5.3.1 Equalization of revenues .................................................................... 26
5.3.2 Balancing differences in spending needs ............................................ 27
5.3.3 Equalization of service costs............................................................... 28
5.4 Criteria for grants allocation........................................................................ 28
5.5 Examples of grants systems from European countries ................................. 29
5.6 Grants to local governments in Poland........................................................ 34
6. Borrowing by local governments ......................................................................... 36
6.1 Why local governments can (should) borrow to finance 
their investments ........................................................................................ 36
6.2 Why local governments should not borrow to cover 
their operating spending ............................................................................. 39
6.3 External regulations on local borrowing...................................................... 40
6.4 Examples of local borrowing and borrowing regulations 
in Western Europe...................................................................................... 41
6.5 Borrowing by local governments in Poland ................................................. 46
7. Autonomy in local financial management and service delivery............................ 50
Endnotes................................................................................................................. 53
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 55
xi
Abstract
The paper discusses issues of fiscal decentralization in European coun-
tries in both theory and practice. It starts with a short presentation of
decentralization’s fundamental values, and the general principles on
which the allocation of revenues between tiers of governments should
be based. Next it discusses in more detail the various sources of local
government revenues: local taxes, grants and borrowing. This includes
a brief clarification of terminology and theoretical principles. Each sec-
tion then presents several examples from various European countries
and finishes with a short discussion of the Polish example. The format
of the paper does not allow for extensive discussion of specific cases,
but indicates a variety of solutions adopted in European countries. A
list of principles related to revenue assignments as well as the various
examples given may be useful as benchmarks for analyzing inter-gov-
ernmental arrangements in countries at an early stage of decentraliza-
tion reforms. The paper is also intended to support LGI’s training activ-
ities, so it is published both in English and Russian.
11. Why local government is useful and why it should 
provide services
1.1 Values in local government and decentralization
Why is local government important? Why is it valued? Why does it per-
sist even into the post-modern world? Why was it that structures of local
democracy were among the first reforms to be introduced in the post-
communist era? In spite of two different rationales for local government
(that the existence of local government is natural for communities, or
that it is functional because it helps the state to function better), schol-
ars often point to three basic values that the structures of local govern-
ment may fulfil (see Sharpe 1973 and Stewart and Greenwood 1995 as
examples):
⋅ liberty (autonomy)—the existence of local government prevents over-
concentration of political power and also allows for different political
choices in different localities. Buchanan states: “even if the division of
powers between the central government and the set of local govern-
ments should not be efficient, there would still be an argument in
favor of delegating some power to those governments as a means of
controlling or checking the central government authority” (Musgrave
& Buchanan 1999, p. 178);
⋅ participation (democracy)—the existence of local governments encour-
ages the active involvement of citizens in self-governance;
⋅ effectiveness—local governments are efficient structures for the deliv-
ery of services tailored to the varying needs of different localities.
Perhaps the last value requires more careful justification. Why would
local governments provide greater effectiveness or efficiency? It is fre-
quently argued that:
(1) with decentralization, decision–makers are closer to the results of
their own decisions, which is helpful in predicting the real effects
2of decisions to be made. Closeness to results in turn supports effec-
tive allocation of resources;
(2) local government enables a better match of policies with local condi-
tions and preferences. Various solutions can be considered in the con-
text of particular local settings. This supports effectiveness both objec-
tively and subjectively (i.e., policies are closer to voters’ preferences);
(3) variation in solutions promotes innovation and diffusion of posi-
tive examples.
That is why local government is a feature of all European states, despite
the many differences between them. Its importance has been further high-
lighted and strengthened by the official adoption of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple in the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, and by the approval
of the European Charter of Local Governments by the Council of Europe.
1.2 Justification for local public spending
But one could perhaps ask: if we operate within a market economy
framework and the market provides the most efficient mechanism for
resource allocation, do we really need local public finance? Indeed, it is
true that the scope and supply of the public sector is often too wide,
and many of the activities actually provided by local governments could
effectively be left for private providers working in a competitive envi-
ronment. But there are at least four areas in which public intervention
is very much required in order to avoid a “local market failure.”
(1)Provision of pure public goods. Such goods may be defined by two
characteristics:
⋅ their consumption is non-rival—i.e., consumption by an individ-
ual is not in competition with consumption by someone else;
⋅ their consumption is non-excludable—i.e., it is not possible to
exclude someone from their consumption because, for example,
he or she did not pay for the service.
3(1)Among typical local services, the best example of a public good is
perhaps street lighting. “Using” light produced by a streetlight does
not place a person in competition with someone else who may ben-
efit from the same light. It is also hard to imagine that the lamp would
be switched on only for those who paid a fee for street-lighting while
others were excluded from consumption of the service. Such an
example serves to demonstrate how the market is not capable of reg-
ulating the provision of public goods.
(2)Several typical local services such as water provision, sewage collec-
tion and treatment, central heating and gas supply are natural
monopolies. Natural monopolies can be defined as sectors in which
a single provider can produce a lower unit cost (for technical rea-
sons) than two or more providers could. Here too, market regula-
tion is not efficient and public intervention is required.
(3)Externalities. By classic definition, externalities are positive or nega-
tive effects of transactions affecting actors who have not been directly
involved in these transactions. Let us try to imagine a specific example
of this in a local community: the provision of fire protection. Consider
the consequences if this service was provided by the private sector only
to those who paid a subscription. It may happen that house A, whose
owner has not paid for fire protection, is on fire. However, should the
fire brigade not intervene, there may be negative effects—the exter-
nalities—for neighbors who have paid their subscription. Obviously,
the fire brigade should stop the fire because of the externalities.
(3)A second example is environmental protection. Let us think about
Mr. B. who burns old tires in his back-yard. This activity has nega-
tive effects that go well beyond his own property, affecting his entire
neighborhood. In both cases, public intervention and the provision
of some services from local budgets will be more effective, since it
allows for internalization of externalities. 
(4)Some authors argue that there are also merit goods, which legit-
imize public financing and intervention. Society may believe that the
4provision of certain services is so important that we should not allow
total freedom for individuals to determine their own level of con-
sumption of those services. Public education is a good example. If
society agrees on the importance of educating all children to a high
standard, then the decision on whether or not to send children to
school becomes a social, not an individual decision. Consumption
of these services can be stimulated by public provision, even if they
are not public goods by their nature.
In practice, the list of activities provided by public entities and financed
from the budget of many local governments is longer than suggested by
the principles described above. This raises the question of whether or not
it might be more efficient to leave some of these additional services and
activities to the private sector or NGOs. In some modern formulations, the
role of local government is defined as enabling (facilitating the activity of
other actors) rather than providing all services directly and exclusively.
2. Criteria for expenditure and revenue assignment
The principles discussed below are among the basic foundations of the
fiscal federalism model. As Rattso (2002) notes, this model is based on
four key assumptions: (1) local governments are mostly responsible for
the delivery of public goods; (2) the base for local finance is provided
by local taxes, i.e., those who pay for services also benefit from them;
(3) there is considerable social (spatial) mobility; and (4) in the case of
local services, the catchment area is close to the area of administrative
jurisdiction, i.e., spillover effects are minimal.
Unfortunately, while these assumptions apply in the United States,
they do not reflect the reality of European systems where local govern-
ments are heavily involved in redistribution, central grants play a sig-
nificant role in financing local governments and people are much less
5mobile than in the US. Nevertheless, the principles of fiscal federalism
remain a good normative base for the evaluation of local financial sys-
tems. In the following sections these are presented in more detail.
2.1 Allocation of local functions
What are the main features of a decentralized system of public finance,
as recommended by fiscal federalism theory?1 The main principles can
be summarized in the following few points:
⋅ The division of functions between central and local governments is
based on the subsidiarity principle, which involves a considerable
amount of fiscal and functional decentralization. The easiest, some-
what simplistic but still powerful indicator of functional decentral-
ization is a ratio of local government spending to national GDP. In
theory, local spending expressed as a proportion of total public spend-
ing would be even better. However, this measure creates several
methodological and data problems because of the existence of vari-
ous extra-budgetary public funds such as social insurance and pen-
sion in several countries. The highest indices in Europe can be found
in Nordic countries, where local governments spend over 20% of GDP.
The ratio is usually lower in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, where it rarely exceeds 10% (see figure 1).2
⋅ The allocation of functions takes into account the specific territorial
organization. If, for example, the structure of a local government is
heavily diversified and has many, very small units, the functional
decentralization cannot be very wide. broad. Small local governments
will not be able to perform many functions effectively. Also, the exis-
tence of many small local governments will require more developed
fiscal equalization schemes. The relationship between the extent of
functional decentralization and the size of local government units has
been convincingly presented by Page & Goldsmith (1987) in their
description of West European systems. They have shown that terri-
6torial amalgamation in North European states (Scandinavia and the
United Kingdom, for example) has supported the transfer of a wider
scope of functions to local government. But in many countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, small settlements are able to provide only a
very limited scope of functions, despite official declarations that every
local government—regardless of its size—has the same powers (for
an extensive discussion of this issue see: Swianiewicz 2002).
⋅ The “golden rule” of the balanced budget (Dafflon 2002) is enforced
by regulations and followed by local governments. In short, the rule
states that current spending should be financed exclusively from cur-
rent revenues (such as taxes, fees for services or grants), while capital
investment expenditures are financed from capital receipts (e.g., bor-
rowing, revenues from property, capital grants). Effective implemen-
tation of this rule requires a separation of current and capital budgets.
⋅ The system of local finance is transparent—both for citizens and for
potential lenders.
⋅ Local government has a considerable amount of discretion to decide
upon the structure of local expenditures. In practice, this discretion
may be limited in several ways. First, by a high share of conditional
grants in local budgets. Second, through detailed, centrally defined
norms and standards for local service delivery. If such standards are
too detailed, local fiscal autonomy becomes just an illusion.
2.2 Local government revenues
Where do local government resources come from? The most general
classification of resources consists of three major categories (to be dis-
cussed briefly later on in this paper):
(1)Own revenues of local governments. The definition of own revenues
includes three elements:
⋅ They are revenues allocated to local governments unconditional-
ly, in full and for an undefined period;
7Figure 1. Local spending as % of GDP
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8⋅ They are related to the local economic base; that is, the growth of
the local economy leads to the growth of local budget own rev-
enues;
⋅ The local government has at least some discretion to decide upon
these categories of revenue. For example, it may set the local tax
rate—at least within certain limits set by central legislation.
The most important category of own revenues is local taxes, and this
category will be further discussed in the paper. Other examples of
local own revenues are fees for services provided or revenues from
local government property.
(2)Transfers from the central budget in form of grants. One should dis-
tinguish between general purpose grants which can be used freely
for any purpose, and specific or conditional grants which can be
spent only for a purpose defined by the grantee.
(3)Borrowed resources. Examples of these include inter-budgetary loans,
bank credits or municipal bonds.
There is one more category of revenue which is very popular in most
European countries: local government shares in central taxes. Quite
often, the local government receives a fixed percentage of (for exam-
ple) personal income tax collected within its territory. This is not an
own revenue, because local government has no discretion to decide
upon the tax rate, tax exemptions and so forth. On the other hand, it
is also not a central government grant in a pure form. Regulations on
shares are very diverse, and depending on the details this category is
somewhat similar to own revenues or to general purpose grants. For
analytical purposes, however, it is convenient to treat it as a separate
category.
The structure of local revenues should conform to the following gen-
eral criteria:
⋅ Vertical allocation of resources (between tiers of government) should
reflect the allocation of functions.
9⋅ A large proportion of local revenues should come from own sources
(specifically in the form of local taxes). There are several arguments
of both a political and economic nature supporting this expectation:
º A system in which a large part of the local budget comes from own
sources supports local government accountability towards the local
population. The shape of the local budget depends to large extent
on decisions on local taxes. This stimulates councilors’ accountability
and also increases citizens’ interest in local government activities. In
general, such a system helps in the development of local democracy.
º Such a system exerts pressure on the “value for money” dimen-
sion—it provides incentive for the rationalization of spending and
the search for possible savings. It is much more difficult to argue
for an increase in local public spending when it is going to be cov-
ered by higher local taxes, than is the case when additional expen-
ditures will be covered by grants from the center.
º Fiscal policy can follow local preferences. In one locality citizens
may expect a greater supply and better quality of services even if
these require higher taxes, while in another people may prefer
lower local taxes and inferior services.
º Previous arguments suggest that a system with a high share of own
revenues reduces pressure on the overall level of public spending.
Having most of the local revenues financed through central grants
leads to excessive demand for local services by local citizens. It fol-
lows that the local government will then exert pressure on central
government in order to receive higher grants.
º This suggested structure of revenues strengthens the political posi-
tion of local governments within a state. Local governments become
important partners who finance and provide significant functions,
rather than simply clients who demand and receive resources from
the center.
º A system organized around high own revenues increases local gov-
ernment interest in supporting local economic development,
10
although as Peterson (1981) noted, local authorities are usually
interested in economic growth for other reasons as well.
º High own revenues, however, have an important consequence that
should be noted in this discussion: they lead inevitably to increas-
ing disparities between rich and poor regions. Local shares in cen-
tral taxes have the same disadvantage, but they do not have most
of the positive features of local taxes enumerated above. That is
why, in the context of fiscal federalism, the shared taxes system is
among the least attractive sources of local revenues.
⋅ There is an equalization system which ensures that each of the local
governments is able to provide at least a minimal set of standard ser-
vices. This system attempts to ensure that the degree of disparity noted
above is held to a certain level. 
3. Local own source revenue
3.1 Local Taxes.
3.1.1 Basic principles of local taxation
There are various candidates for local taxes, and several criteria to help
us choose the most appropriate mix for the country. Some of these cri-
teria are identical with requirements for good taxes in general, but oth-
ers are specific to local government. The most important elements of
the “check-list” may be summarized in following way:
⋅ The allocation of tax yields is proportional to allocation of func-
tions. If we require that a large proportion of local revenues comes
from own sources (as suggested in the previous section), we need a
tax system that provides such an opportunity. So, it is imperative to
ensure that the local tax base provides revenues nearly sufficient to
deliver the most important local functions.
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⋅ The distribution of the tax base is even geographically. This ensures
that differences between local authorities with high and low local tax
bases are not overwhelming. For example, the tax base for the tax on
exploitation of natural resources would be very unevenly distributed,
while property taxes are much more evenly available for every local
government. If this condition were not followed, there would be huge
differences between “rich” and “poor” jurisdictions. If local govern-
ment is responsible for important services, this will imply a complex
system of horizontal equalization. Obviously, there is no tax from
which yields are distributed in space in a perfectly even way, but some
potential local taxes are better and some are worse from the point of
view of this criterion.
⋅ The tax is well defined in geographical space. Is it easy or difficult
to decide which local government should collect and receive the tax?
With property taxes, for example, collection is very easy because every
property is located in one jurisdiction. Similarly, personal income tax
is not a problem, regardless of whether it is paid at the place of resi-
dence (as in most European countries) or at the place of work (as in
a minority of countries, such as Ukraine). But the case of corporate
income tax is much more complicated. If a company is registered in
one city but operates and generates income in several other places,
which local government should benefit from the tax? A partial solu-
tion adopted in Poland is that tax revenues are distributed among local
governments proportionally to the number of employees working in
the individual localities. But this solution is complicated and far from
perfect. The case of Value Added Tax is even more complicated, if not
hopeless (from the point of view of the criterion discussed).
⋅ Visibility of the tax. Certain taxes such as property tax or personal
income tax are more visible than others, like VAT or excise tax. There is
no doubt that visible taxes stimulate a local government’s accountability.
⋅ The elasticity of tax yields against inflation. This is an important
item for every tax, but probably especially important in the case of
12
local taxes. On the one hand low elasticity (as in the case of property
tax) enforces more careful financial policies of local governments.
Increasing the tax rate, even if in reality it only reflects inflation, is
always politically difficult. On the other hand, elastic taxes provide a
better financial base for delivery of local functions.
⋅ The tax base should be relatively immobile. Otherwise, tax payers
can easily migrate between jurisdictions causing excessive tax com-
petition. Property tax or even personal income tax is better from that
point of view than corporate income tax.
⋅ Last but not least: the system of local taxes should not be too frag-
mented or too complicated. In some countries there is a large num-
ber of small local taxes, none of which brings very significant revenue
to local budgets. The cost of tax collection in such a system is usually
relatively high. A system like this is also unnecessarily complicated and
non-transparent, reducing the accountability value of local taxation.
3.1.2 Local taxes in the practice of European countries
In practice, most European countries have several local taxes, although
one of them is usually more important than the others. The United King-
dom, with only one local tax (currently based on property, although
not in a typical, orthodox form), provides one of the rare exceptions to
this rule. Countries differ from each other in how much local discretion
is allowed in deciding upon local taxes. In most cases there is a maxi-
mal ceiling or bracket within which local government can make its own
decision. However, in some countries (for example Denmark, Sweden
until recently, and the United Kingdom until the mid-1980s) local gov-
ernments are totally free to decide on the local tax rate.
In European countries there are basically two models of local taxation:
⋅ based on property taxes (there might be other local taxes, but prop-
erty tax is the most important). The United Kingdom probably pro-
13
vides the best example, but France, Spain or Poland also fall into
this category.
⋅ based on local income taxes. All four Nordic countries provide
good examples of this type of local taxation (note: local income tax
should not be confused with receiving a local share in an income
tax which remains a central tax). One of a very few countries in
Central and Eastern Europe that have decided to go in the direc-
tion of building local income tax is Croatia.3
There are some countries in which local governments may make a choice
from among a wider set of available taxes. This is the case in Hungary,
where local governments are entitled to introduce any or all of the fol-
lowing taxes: land parcel tax, building tax, communal tax on private
individuals, communal tax on entrepreneurs, tourism tax and local busi-
ness tax (Hogye 2000).
Local governments in different countries have a different amount of
discretion in deciding upon rates of local taxes. Typically, a maximum
tax rate or ceiling is set which the local decision cannot exceed. This is
the case in Italy where the local property tax rate may vary from 0.4 to
0.7% of the taxable values. There is also a limitation on the extent of
changes to the local surcharge on personal income tax. From year x to
x+1, the change cannot be larger than 0.2% (Fraschini 2002). In the
United Kingdom, the freedom to set local tax rates is indirectly limited
through caps on the overall level of local government spending (Finance
and..., 1996). In Sweden, local governments that set excessively high
rates may be “punished” by the reduction of state grants. In Denmark,
local governments are basically free to set any local tax rate. Whatever
is the particular solution, in practice there is often a significant varia-
tion in tax rates between individual local governments. For example, in
the UK in 1997 the basic rate of council tax varied from less than 300
to over 900 GBP. In Denmark, local tax rates vary by around 30% in
municipalities and around 10% in counties (Pedersen 2002).
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In most of the developed countries, the property tax paid is more or
less proportional to the market value of properties. However, in most
of the Central and East European countries property taxes are devised
differently, being dependent on the type of property and its size, but
not on market value. Most advisors working in our part of Europe for
international organizations or Western governments recommend reforms
leading to the introduction of ad valorem property tax. If treated liter-
ally, however, this reform may be considered controversial and admin-
istratively unmanageable or costly. Such a reform has to take a relatively
long time, as it is expensive and feared by numerous tax-payers. There
are two typical arguments for the reform: one is that only ad valorem
property tax allows significant revenues to be collected for the local bud-
gets. The second argument refers to the fairness of the ad valorem tax.
Figure 2, illustrating revenues from property tax in various coun-
tries as a proportion of GDP, shows that the first opinion is a myth. As
shown below, one may argue that there exist alternative methods for
varying the property tax which make it more fair and proportional to
the “ability to pay,” but which (although imperfect) are much cheaper
and simpler to implement.
Polish property tax has very little to do with the value of properties;
nevertheless, it provides a significant source of the income of local bud-
gets. This does not mean the Polish system is perfect in this respect. It
is definitely not fair that the owner of a poor house in a remote village
can be taxed the same amount as the owner of a similar house (in size,
not value) in the center of Warsaw. But there may be ways to get around
this problem that are simpler and easier to implement. An interesting
example is provided by the Czech and Slovak systems, in which the
maximal rate of property tax is differentiated depending on the size of
the town it is located in. In Slovakia, for example, the maximal rate in
the capital city of Bratislava is 4.5 times higher than in a small village
with fewer than 1,000 citizens. (Kling et al 2002). In addition, local gov-
ernment can differentiate the rate depending on the “zone” in which the
15
Figure 2. Revenues from the proerty tax as % of GDP (1994)
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property is located within the city. Such a system largely reflects the
variation of the value of properties and at the same time is much cheap-
er and easier to implement than the typical ad valorem tax. These tech-
niques are good approximations of an ad valorem property tax, but they
are administratively feasible and less expensive.
3.1.3 Local taxes in Poland
Municipalities are the only local governments in Poland which have the
power of taxation. For the time being, the upper tiers—counties and
regions—are financed predominantly by central grants with the small
addition of shared revenues from income taxes.
There are several local (municipal) taxes in Poland, the most impor-
tant of which include:
⋅ property tax (which alone brings in over 12% of total municipal rev-
enues),
⋅ tax on agricultural land, and
⋅ tax on vehicles.
Municipalities also receive 27.6% of personal income tax and 5% of cor-
porate income tax collected within their territory,4 but these are shared
revenues with no local discretion to decide tax rates or exemptions. In
the case of local taxes, the Law regulates the maximum tax rate and the
local council is free to decide any rate up to this ceiling. Local council
can also grant tax exemptions.
In most cases the property tax yield depends on the taxable area
(number of square meters), and not on the value of property. There are
different rates adopted for different types of properties such as:
⋅ residential houses (for example, in 2003 the maximum rate per square
meter is 0.51 PLN, or about 0.14 USD);
⋅ plots of land related to commercial activity (the maximum rate for
2003—0.56 PLN or 0.15 USD per square meter);
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⋅ commercial space in buildings (the maximum rate for 2003—15.86
PLN or 4.2 USD);
⋅ undeveloped plots of land (but not used for agriculture or forestry
purposes) .
As mentioned above, there is an on-going discussion on the reform of
the property tax, in order to make it reflect the value of individual prop-
erties. But the discussion is far from finished and it is very difficult to
predict the final result.
How may the Polish local tax system be assessed against the criteria
formulated at the beginning of this section?
⋅ (-) The allocation of tax yields is not proportional to the alloca-
tion of functions. The negative assessment applies primarily to the
situation of county and regional governments which do not have own
tax revenues; it is much better on the municipal level. The ratio of
revenues from own sources to total budget revenues is somewhat lower
than in some West-European countries such as Denmark or Sweden,
but similar or even higher than in most of the others, including the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Spain. A negative situation even
in the municipalities, however, is the gradually diminishing role of
revenues from own sources in municipal budgets — 47% of total bud-
get revenues in 1992, but 40% in 1995 and only 33% in 2001.
⋅ (+/-) Uneven geographical distribution of the tax base. There are
significant differences in distribution of the local tax base. In 2001,
own revenues constituted well over 40% of budgets in cities but just
over 20% in rural areas. Taking into account inequalities between
regions, the variation is even larger. But probably this level of inequal-
ity is inevitable regardless of the selection of local taxes.
⋅ (-)The system of local taxes is fragmented and complicated. There
are many small local fees and taxes (such as the tax on dog owners)
that do not raise significant revenues but are costly to collect and com-
plicated to administer.
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⋅ (+)Tax is well defined in geographical space. Polish local taxes do
not produce major problems in this respect. Taking tax-sharing into
account, there are problems with defining the local share of corporate
tax in the case of companies that are registered in one municipality
but operate branches in various locations. A partial answer to this
problem is provided by regulation, by which municipalities receive
an allocation proportional to the number of employees working in
each of the local branches. This solution is far from perfect, however.
⋅ (+)Visibility of the tax. Most of the local taxes in Poland are visible.
⋅ (-)The low elasticity of tax yields against inflation. Property tax,
tax on vehicles, as well as small local fees and taxes are not elastic
against inflation. The only exception is perhaps a tax on agriculture,
which is related to the market price of crops.
⋅ (+)The tax base is relatively immobile. This principle is definitely
true of the property tax, which is by far the most important local own
revenue.
Thus, recommended changes might go in two directions: simplification
of the system, and strengthening of the local tax base (perhaps at the
expense of tax sharing) first of all at the county and regional, but also
at the municipal level. Potentially, this might be done in one of the fol-
lowing two ways:
⋅ Transformation of present shares in central income taxes into local
surcharges to income tax. Implementation of such a reform might fol-
low the experiences of Scandinavian countries;
⋅ Reform of the property tax together with an introduction of county
and regional parts of the tax. This can but does not need to include a
change towards the ad valorem property tax system.
But it is necessary to stress that the overall level of tax burden for citi-
zens and enterprises should not increase as a result of the reform. The
reform of local taxes can never be discussed in abstraction from the broad-
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er change in public finance in general. If the overall burden of local taxes
increases, there must be compensation through the reduction of some
central taxes. The central level would not incur an additional burden
from this, since strengthening of the local tax base allows state transfers
to be reduced. The focus of this should be on the principle of equaliza-
tion, rather than on a general vertical equalization (see next section).
3.2 Other revenues from own sources
Local taxes are by far the most important but not the only source of local
own revenues. Two important additional sources are provided by:
⋅ Revenues from local government property. These revenues may be
related to the sale of plots or buildings, but also to the longer-term lease
or rent of municipal properties. In Poland, for example, some local gov-
ernments’ considerable revenues come from renting commercial space
on the ground-floors of municipal housing developments. In some coun-
tries revenues from property (especially from sales) can legally be used
for capital investments, but not to cover current expenditures. Even if
such a limitation is not imposed by law, its implementation is advisable
as it helps to follow the “golden rule” of the balanced budget;
⋅ User fees and charges for services provided by local governments.
Some services, especially those that are pure public goods (such as
street lighting) are delivered free of charge; i.e., they are financed from
general budget revenues. Fees and charges for other services are often
collected directly by service providers and they are not always reflect-
ed in the local government budget. In some accounting systems (such
as those used in Poland) the municipal budget shows only the net
flow of subsidy, if any, from local budget to local service provider.
The general rule suggests that private goods (such as water con-
sumption) should be financed entirely by consumers. But in some
cases, there are important arguments for subsidizing delivery of the
service. For example, most cities subsidize local public transportation
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in order to stimulate the use of mass transportation instead of private
cars, which may help to reduce traffic congestion and environmental
pollution. In some British cities (Jasiñski 1998), the private provider
is expected to cover the full cost of most services from the sale of tick-
ets, but the city subsidizes evening and week-end services. Local gov-
ernment systems vary in the discretion local authorities have to decide
the level of local services. A detailed discussion of this issue is out of
the scope of this booklet, but it definitely influences the assessment
of fiscal decentralization. 
4. Shared revenues
Shared revenues are treated in many different ways in various countries,
so it is very difficult to compare these revenues internationally. In gen-
eral, by tax sharing we mean allocation of a part of the revenue from
certain taxes to local governments.
There are a few characteristics that help us to compare various sys-
tems:
⋅ The stability of the local government’s share of the tax yield. In sev-
eral countries in transition the share of local governments is simply
defined by annual budget law. Quite often the share changes signifi-
cantly (even from 0% to 100%) and unpredictably from year t to t+1.
This was the typical situation in Ukraine before the implementation
of the new Budget Code in 2002. In such a situation it is obviously
very difficult to expect that local governments will be able to develop
medium or long-term financial plans, or to implement any coherent
development policies. But in some countries the share is stably defined
by laws that determine local government revenues (as it was in the
Polish case described above).
⋅ The manner in which shared revenues are allocated to individual local
governments. In some cases (such as Poland, or Ukraine after the new
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Budget Code of 2002) each local government receives a fixed share of
the tax yield collected within its category. In such a situation the shared
tax is very similar to local taxes with a flat (uniform across the coun-
try) tax rate. This solution, however, entails the disadvantages of local
tax revenues described in section 2.2, not having most of the positive
features related to financing through own local revenues. In some
other countries, the share of individual local government does not
depend on a local collection but is allocated on the basis of various
criteria such as size of population. In England, for example, revenues
from the tax on commercial properties are allocated proportionally to
the population size of individual jurisdictions. This is frequently the
approach taken in Central and Eastern Europe as well, especially where
the share in personal income tax is concerned. Such a solution is clos-
er to the general grant than to local tax, and sometimes is classified in
that way. For example, in Poland, the so-called road grant (part of the
general purpose grant) is fixed as a share in the excise tax on petrol
and is distributed to local governments proportionally to the length
of roads and intensity of traffic (see section below).
In some countries, instead of sharing taxes by origin or by formula, local
governments are allowed to impose a surcharge on the central tax. In
this case, local governments have at least limited discretion. Usually per-
sonal income tax is subject to surcharging, when the tax base and tax
administration are kept under central government control. Lower lev-
els of government (municipalities, counties) decide the size of the sur-
charge. They may levy a flat rate on the total amount of the central tax,
as in Norway, or they might build up their own tax policy, as is the case
in Denmark, Sweden or Switzerland. In most cases national legislation
puts limits on the maximum local surtax rate in order to avoid harmful
tax competition between different levels of government. For example,
this is the case with the local surcharge to personal income tax in Croa-
tia or in Italy (Fraschini 2002, Alibegovic 2002). In other cases (Den-
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mark and—until recently—Sweden, for example), local governments
are not legally limited in setting their rates (see the discussion in sec-
tion 3.1.2). From the political economy point of view, such a solution
locates the tax share very close to typical local taxes, since they support
local accountability.
5. Grants
5.1 Reasons for grants
Why are grants necessary at all? As mentioned above, the root of most
grant systems lies in the willingness to reduce inequalities between local
governments. The following specific arguments for grants systems are
typically mentioned in the literature:
⋅ vertical equity. Sometimes the allocation of resources between tiers
of government does not secure sufficient funds for local governments.
If such vertical imbalance is significant, the situation should be treat-
ed as a violation of fiscal federalism principles. Nevertheless, it is quite
common in European inter-governmental financial systems.
⋅ Horizontal equity. Each citizen should have access to the same level
of services for the same price (local taxes paid). If there were no equal-
ization, citizens in poor municipalities would need to pay much high-
er taxes than citizens in more affluent localities.
⋅ Support for local governments that provide services to more than
their own residents. The catchment area of services can rarely be iden-
tical with the borders of geographical jurisdictions. This is especially obvi-
ous in big cities, which often provide many services (such as secondary
education, street cleaning, street lights and maintenance of local streets)
not only for their residents, but also for many visitors. If not for special
support through the transfer grants, local communities might not be
interested in providing a sufficient supply of those services.
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⋅ Securing a minimal, national standard of services. Standards are
especially important if local governments are responsible for such ser-
vices as education, health care or social welfare.
⋅ Stimulation of the supply of merit goods that national policies
treat as priorities.
But there are also arguments against equalization. The most typical
include:
⋅ Equalization is in conflict with the most effective—market—alloca-
tion of capital. It also disturbs the natural variation of prices (in par-
ticular, the prices of properties).
⋅ Equalization is in conflict with local fiscal autonomy. It makes it diffi-
cult to adjust local policies to local preferences. This argument is espe-
cially valid if equalization is done through specific (conditional) grants.
⋅ Equalization is a disincentive for stimulation of local development.
⋅ Equalization leads to long-term dependency of some regions on exter-
nal aid.
5.2 Types of grants
The most basic distinction is between general purpose grants and condi-
tional grants. General purpose grants are transferred without any addi-
tional conditions. They can be spent on any function local government
wishes, and if unspent until the end of a year, they can be kept by local
government. Conditional (or specific) grants, on the other hand, are offered
for and can be spent only for a purpose defined by the donor. Normally,
grants unspent during the fiscal year have to be returned to the donor.
It is not always easy to distinguish between these two types. Some-
times there are grants which are calculated on the basis of sector-specif-
ic factors and have names like road-grant or education-grant, but which
in fact can be spent freely by local government. They should therefore
be treated as general purpose. The British system of Standard Spending
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Assessment provides a good example. Spending needs are assessed sep-
arately for various services (for example there is a separate SSA for edu-
cation, for police, for roads, for social services, etc.). But eventually, on
the basis of comparison of spending needs with own revenues of local
authority, a single “check” is transferred to local government and can be
freely spent on any function according to local preferences. In Poland,
the education grant or road grant to county authorities works on a sim-
ilar basis. Despite the name or the method of calculation of the grant,
the actual spending of the resources depends on local decision only.
From the point of view of allocation method, grants can be divided
into those determined subjectively and those based on objective criteria:
⋅ The first type is based on subjective decisions made by bureaucrats
or politicians who decide upon grants allocations. “Traditionally” (i.e.,
before 1990) in most East and Central European countries, there were
no clear and transparent criteria for grants allocations. Instead, deci-
sions were made by central level or upper-tier administration on the
basis of their subjective judgment of needs. This situation still pre-
vails in some post-communist countries.
⋅ Alternatively, we have systems based on objective, measurable criteria.
The latter approach may be criticized on the basis that the allocation
criteria frequently may be accused of being imperfect. But criticism of
the former method may be much more substantial:
⋅ The subjective method is vulnerable to political manipulation. In the
most extreme form of this, government helps its allies and discrimi-
nates against its political opponents in local governments);
⋅ The subjective method is always not transparent;
⋅ Allocations determined subjectively are unstable, so long-term finan-
cial planning is problematic.
If we concentrate on systems based on a set of objective criteria, we can
still distinguish between two main types of formula:
⋅ lump-sum grants—in which the fixed amount of transfer is calculat-
ed on the basis of measurable indicators such as population size, local
tax base, economic wealth of population and demographic structure;
⋅ matching grants—in which the amount allocated to individual local
governments depends on the tax effort of the local community. In
simple terms, the more resources that are provided by local govern-
ment from its own revenues, the more matching funds it can receive
from the center.
These systems have different macro and microeconomic consequences.
On a micro level, with the matching grant it is much easier to follow
the horizontal equity principle. Let us consider three jurisdictions in
which spending needs and unit costs for local services are identical. We
will also assume that the local tax revenues are proportional to the local
tax base and that the grant system tends to achieve full equalization.
(Releasing these assumptions would not change but only complicate the
arguments presented below.) Let us further imagine that the distribu-
tion of the tax base is like that in table 1.
Table 1. Impact of lump-sum and matching grants on horizontal equity—an example
With a certain starting local tax rate (for example, with the maximum
possible rate of the local tax—such is the logic of the Polish equaliza-
tion scheme as well as grant schemes in several other countries) the prin-
ciple of horizontal equity is precisely followed by both systems.
Local Tax Revenues Grant Revenue New grant in the Total local revenues 
tax rate from the from the form of: in the form of:
base local tax reduced Lump- Matching Lump- Matching 
local tax sum grant sum grant
(2%)
A 1200 5 60 00 24 00 00 24 24
B 0600 5 30 30 12 20 12 32 24
C 0200 5 10 50 4 50 20 54 24
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But what will happen if all local governments being considered decide
to reduce the rate of local tax in the same proportion? The logic of match-
ing grants will lead to similar reductions of the grant transferred to local
governments, so the total revenues will remain identical in all three local
governments. But if we follow the lump-sum system, the amount of the
grant will remain the same regardless of the change in the local tax effort.
As a consequence, the total revenues in jurisdiction A will be signifi-
cantly lower than those in jurisdiction C, despite the fact that the local
tax base in A is higher, and both local governments have the same tax
policy. Obviously, the example in table 1 is an extreme one and it rarely
exists in reality in such an extreme form, but it demonstrates equity
problems with the lump-sum systems.
On the other hand, it has also been shown that the matching system
tends to lead to stimulation of higher public spending than in the case
of the lump-sum systems. This means that the lump-sum system is much
safer from the point of view of macroeconomic fiscal and counter-cycli-
cal policies. It also explains why lump-sum schemes are much more fre-
quent in practice. Matching grants can be found more often in capital
investment grant schemes. In the latter case, the idea of rewarding local
community effort is widely accepted and any negative impact on macro-
economic indices is minimal.
5.3 Types of equalization
5.3.1 Equalization of revenues
Once we agree that equalization is one of the main reasons for the exis-
tence of grant systems, we need to define what we want to equalize. The
simplest approach refers to the equalization of revenues. We take into
account the local tax base but not actual local revenues, since local gov-
ernments may have different tax policies which influence the level of
budget revenues. We realize that the tax base is unevenly distributed
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among geographical regions, and we try to support units with the low-
est tax base. We can do this in two ways:
⋅ through vertical equalization schemes—in which “the poorest” local
budgets are supported by grants transferred from the upper tier (most
often from the central government);
⋅ through horizontal equalization schemes—in which less affluent local
governments are supported by the richest jurisdictions of the same
tier. This method is often called a “Robin Hood tax.”
The former of these systems functions in the United Kingdom, and
the latter in Sweden. In Poland we have a combination of both. How-
ever, vertical equalization plays a much more important role than hor-
izontal.
5.3.2 Balancing differences in spending needs
But equalization of revenues has important limitations. It does not take
into account that spending needs are diverse. I do not mean the vari-
ation resulting from different local preferences (different demand for
local services) but the variation that results from an external environ-
ment. A few examples will illustrate this:
Example 1. Snow removal from local and regional roads. The need for
this service is obviously related to climate differences and will certain-
ly be higher in mountain areas than in lowlands.
Example 2. Social care for the elderly and for people with long-term ill-
nesses. The need for this service depends heavily on demographic struc-
ture. It is higher in localities with a higher share of elderly people.
Example 3. Health care. It is well known that usage of health care is
most intense in the case of small children, women who are pregnant
and elderly people. Spending needs will therefore depend on age and
gender distributions as well as on factors which influence a number of
diseases, such as environmental pollution.
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Example 4. Street cleaning and maintenance of roads. The needs are
larger in places where the number of users and traffic congestion are
greater. In practice, higher needs are found first of all in the centers of
the biggest cities.
If such factors are not taken into account, the equalization scheme
cannot be fair.
5.3.3 Equalization of service costs
The third dimension that needs to be taken into account is related to
unit costs of service delivery. Obviously, we should relate this to objec-
tive factors that influence unit costs, not to the variation of local gov-
ernments’ effectiveness. Once again we can use examples to illustrate
this phenomenon.
Example 1. Primary education. Costs per pupil will be lower in the
densely populated city than in sparsely populated rural areas with many
small villages. In the latter case, it will be necessary either to maintain
very small schools in every village (with a low rate of pupils per teacher)
or to organize transportation for pupils traveling to the larger school.
Both of these solutions are expensive.
Example 2. Construction of a new road. In a big city the value of plots
that need to be bought from present owners is many times higher than
in a small, rural locality. This will result in a variation of the cost per
kilometer of the road built.
5.4 Criteria for grants allocation
Criteria used for grants allocation should be based on the following prin-
ciples:
⋅ Criteria used in the allocation formula should be significantly (in the
sense that the word is used in statistics) related to spending needs
and/or unit costs as well as grounded in theory.
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⋅ Variables used should have diverse values across geographical juris-
dictions. It makes no sense to complicate the formula by using vari-
ables which have similar values across the country.
⋅ Variables used in the formula should not be significantly correlated
with each other—it would complicate the system without providing
important, new information.
⋅ Factors taken into account should be measurable, and information on
them should be available and reliable.
⋅ Factors considered should not be vulnerable to statistical manipula-
tion by interested recipients of the grant. For example, Swedish expe-
rience in health care suggests using variables such as age and gender
structure, standardized mortality rate and environmental pollution,
but not variables such as the number of cases of individual diseases,
the number of patients in the hospital, etc. It has been demonstrated
that records kept in hospitals and ambulatories can easily be used to
manipulate the latter group of indices if this leads to a potentially high-
er grant.
⋅ The system should be neutral from the point of view of local tax pol-
icy (in the lump-sum system). In the matching grant system the high-
er tax effort is rewarded with a higher grant. But taking into account
actual local revenues (not the local tax base) might lead to the oppo-
site situation, in which lower tax effort would be “rewarded” with
higher grants allocated. The unfairness of such a solution is obvious.
5.5 Examples of grants systems from European countries5
In most European countries, the last 20 years have brought a gradual
shift from fragmented specific grants to the consolidated general pur-
pose block grant system. The Council of Europe recommends that equal-
ization systems should “enable local authorities, if they wish, to provide
a broadly similar range of service while levying similar rates of local tax-
ation” (Recommendation No. 4 R(91) of the Committee of Ministers,
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quoted after Blair 1993). This formulation clearly refers to the horizontal
equity principle.
In most European countries the equalization function is performed
by general purpose grants, although there are some cases of equalization
through specific grants as well. The dominant form of equalization is
through vertical schemes (i.e., grants from the centre to local govern-
ments), but in some countries (Sweden, Denmark) horizontal equaliza-
tion between local governments of the same tier plays an important role.
There is a great variation in the number of criteria used for alloca-
tion formulas. Blair (1993) distinguished between three types of West-
European systems:
⋅ Sophisticated systems based on a huge number of criteria illustrating
variation in spending needs, unit costs and local tax base. Examples
are provided by the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Norway;
⋅ Countries that tend to concentrate (in the assessment of spending
needs) on a smaller number of key criteria. Examples are provided by
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Portugal;
⋅ Simplistic systems that rely heavily on population size—Spain, Greece
and Italy.
One could add to Blair’s observations, that more complex systems are found
first of all in countries with a higher degree of functional decentralization.
When local governments are responsible for a wide range of services, sim-
plification of grant systems becomes dangerous. But if the scope of local
activities is narrow, complication of the system is unnecessary.
Perhaps the most interesting example of the sophisticated grant sys-
tem is provided by the United Kingdom. The Revenues Support Grant
(RSG) is a lump-sum transfer, the calculation of which is based on Stan-
dard Spending Assessment (SSA).6
SSA represents the amount that the government considers local
authorities need to spend on all services. This amount is financed by a
combination of local council tax, shares in a tax on commercial prop-
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erties (National Non-Domestic Rate) and Revenue Support Grant. The
SSA is calculated separately for the main sectors of local functions, but
the grant calculated on this basis is transferred as one amount in the
form of a general purpose, not an earmarked, sum. The actual budget
at local government disposal may be higher or lower than the SSA esti-
mation, since it depends also on the rate of the local tax (RSG is calcu-
lated on the assumption of one, standard local tax rate for all local gov-
ernments across the country).
RSG has an equalization character and is calculated in such a way
that if all local authorities were to spend at the level of SSA, all author-
ities should be able to set the same local tax rate. This means the sys-
tem assumes full horizontal equity. The grant amount is calculated as:
RSG(i) = SSA(i) – NNDR (i) – CT(i)
where:
RSG(i) = grant for jurisdiction i
SSA(i) = standard spending assessment for jurisdiction i
NNDR(i) = revenues from shares in central tax in jurisdiction i
CT(i) = revenues from local council tax (assuming a standard tax rate
for the whole country).
In other words, the higher the SSA for a given local government and
the lower the tax base, the higher the amount transferred in the form
of RSG will be. The list of criteria used for SSA calculation is very long
and the method of calculation is complicated. For example, variables
used in order to determine the SSA for the most important local ser-
vices include:
⋅ Education. The SSA is calculated separately for kindergartens, pri-
mary schools, secondary schools and other education tasks on the
basis of following criteria:
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º Number of pupils in local government schools
º Number of pupils residing in the local jurisdiction
º Lone parent families
º Families receiving support from social welfare
º Children born outside the UK, Ireland, USA, former British Com-
monwealth countries, or whose parents were born outside of these
areas
º Population density
º Number of free meals served in schools
º Costs correction (for example, taking into account higher salaries
in London).
⋅ Personal Social Services. The SSA is calculated separately for chil-
dren’s social services, residential care of the elderly, domiciliary care
of the elderly, social services for the 18-64 year age group. The cal-
culation takes into account following criteria:
º Number of children 0-17 years old
º Children in lone parent families
º Children in rented accommodation (families not being home owners)
º Children in families receiving income support
º Homeless households with children or a pregnant woman
º People aged 65 years and over
º People aged 75-84 years
º People aged 85 years and over
º Elderly people in rented accommodation
º Elderly people living alone
º Elderly people in receipt of income support
º Elderly people with limiting long-term illness
º Elderly people in receipt of attendance allowance
º Elderly people who are not in a couple and who are not heads of
households
º Number of people aged 18-64 years
º Children in non-white ethnic groups
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Similar calculations are made to establish Standard Spending Assess-
ment for police, fire protection, roads maintenance, housing benefits,
other local services and capital financing costs. 
The medium level of complexity of the grant system is found in the
Netherlands. In the Dutch system, grants from the central government
play a crucial role in financing local services. The list of variables used
as factors in the allocation formula includes:
⋅ Local tax base (related to the local property tax)
⋅ Number of children
⋅ Number of elderly people
⋅ Number of people with low income
⋅ Number of people receiving social welfare support
⋅ Number of citizens in national minority groups
⋅ Number of potential users of local services (established on the basis
of Christaller’s central place theory)
⋅ Area of the municipality and area of surface waters
⋅ Number of flats
⋅ Built up area
⋅ Presence of historical buildings
⋅ Presence of buildings built before 1830
⋅ Fixed amount for the biggest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hague, Utrecht)
The Dutch system is much simpler than the British one; nevertheless,
it is still much more complicated than that found in most post-com-
munist European countries.
An example of the simplistic grant system is provided by Spain,7
where 70% of the state grant to local governments is proportional to the
size of the population. However, the population number is weighted
according to the size of the various local government units. For juris-
dictions below 5,000 citizens the weight is 1, but for cities over 500,000
the weight grows to 1.85. The next 25% of the total amount of grants
is transferred according to a formula which takes into account the local
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tax effort (an element of the matching grant system). The last 5% of
grants is based on the size of the school system in the jurisdiction.
A recent reform of the grants allocation system introduced in 2002
in Ukraine suggests that a change towards allocations based on a set of
objective, measurable criteria is also possible in Eastern Europe.
Although the present formula approved in Ukraine is far from perfect
and requires serious modification, the system introduced by the new
Budget Code is a huge step forward on the way towards a fair and trans-
parent allocation system.
5.6 Grants to local governments in Poland
The general grant system in Poland is based on a similar methodology
for all three tiers of local government (municipal, county and regional).
It consists of the following elements:
⋅ The equalization grant—which takes into account almost exclusively
the local tax base, but leaves aside variation in spending needs and unit
costs. In municipalities, the basis for equalization is the national aver-
age expressed in per capita terms, while in counties and regions there
is an effort to achieve equalization with the richest local government.
In municipalities there is a very small element (more symbolic than
real) which takes into account the higher spending needs of big cities.
On the municipal level a small portion of equalization comes from the
horizontal equalization mechanism, while on the county and regional
levels the system fully depends on vertical mechanisms;
⋅ The education grant—which is basically per pupil, but with higher
weightings given to rural areas (but not differentiating between sparse-
ly and densely populated rural areas), handicapped pupils, some voca-
tional secondary schools and schools for national minorities;
⋅ The road grant (for counties and regions only)—taking into account
the total length of maintained roads and the intensity of traffic;
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⋅ The compensation grant (for municipalities only)—which provides
exemptions from local taxes which are decided by the National Par-
liament.
The Polish grant systems have some strengths which may provide a basis
for recommendations in other countries, but they also display several
weaknesses. These strengths and weaknesses may be summarized in the
following way:
Strengths:
⋅ The allocation of general purpose grants is based on objective and
measurable criteria. The allocation is not vulnerable to political manip-
ulation or to the subjective decision of bureaucrats.
⋅ The total amount of the “pot to be divided” is defined by the Act (for
example, the education grant reflects at least 12.6% of central budget
revenues) and is not the subject of an annual bargaining process. Local
governments assume their share of the business cycle burden, since
overall budget revenues depend on the economic growth rate. At the
same time, sub-national government interests are protected from
manipulation by the central government.
⋅ The allocation criteria for general purpose grants are relatively stable,
enabling long-term financial planning by local authorities.
⋅ There is a modest degree of equalization that is not enough to create
a disincentive for more affluent local authorities.
Weaknesses
⋅ The principle of horizontal equity is not fully implemented in the Pol-
ish system. The equalization grant is almost exclusively an equaliza-
tion of revenues, and does not take into account variation in spend-
ing needs and unit costs. Even in those rare instances where spending
needs are considered, it is done in a very problematic way.
⋅ There are unfairly favorable arrangements for small local governments
(below 15,000 citizens), which receive rewards in the form of higher
grants for lowering the local property tax.
36
⋅ The strengths discussed above refer to general purpose grants, while
the complex system of conditional (earmarked) grants is unstable and
not transparent.
⋅ The proportion of grants within total local budgets is acceptable at
the municipal level, where more than 30% of revenues comes from
local sources, and the next 25% in the form of tax-sharing. At the
county level, however, the proportion is definitely too high, with over
90% of budget revenue coming in form of grants. This is also the case
at the regional level where grants constitute around 80% of total rev-
enue. This structure is considered only temporary, but the situation
still continues despite official declarations promising a general reform
that was to have been introduced back in 2001.
6. Borrowing by local governments
As mentioned in the first section, the “golden rule” of the balanced
budget prescribes that local authorities should never create a deficit in
the budget for the purpose of covering current costs. But the same rule
allows—and in some formulations even promotes—prudent borrowing
for capital purposes. What are the reasons for such a recommendation?
6.1 Why local governments can (should) borrow 
to finance their investments
The most important arguments for borrowing by local governments may
be summarized as follows:
⋅ Inter-temporal and geographical equity. The costs of a project under-
taken by a local government are incurred as soon as the project is
implemented, but the benefits derived from the investment are spread
out over a longer period. For example, the construction of a new
sewage treatment plant requires a major one-time expenditure, but
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will last for many years. The same may be said of the purchase of city
buses. If capital projects such as these are financed out of current rev-
enues, then some local tax-payers who helped to finance the project
through their local taxes may not benefit from them in the future (due
to migration out of city, for example). At the same time, those who
benefit from the project (users of the water treatment station or pas-
sengers of the city bus) may not have participated in financing it if
they moved to the city after it was completed, or if it was completed
either when they were small children or before they were born. By
financing such projects through bank credit (or bond issues), local
governments can ensure that most users pay for the benefits either
through local taxation or directly in the form of user charges. In this
way, payments from current users are partially used to re-pay the loan. 
⋅ A close relationship between those who benefit from the project
and those who pay for its completion supports optimal allocation
of resources. This argument sounds a bit abstract, but it can be found
in every textbook of management or economics.
⋅ Benefits from the acceleration of local development quite often
overshadow the cost of debt servicing. This may be illustrated by
a very simple example. Suppose that City A possesses a piece of land
that may be very attractive to a potential investor, but there is no good
access road to the plot. The city government has to choose from among
following solutions: (i) finance the road construction from current
revenues, agree to allow a few years to complete the project, and try
to attract an investor a few years from now; (ii) try to find a potential
investor now, agreeing that the price received for the plot will be lower
and understanding that some potential investors may withdraw from
the tender; (iii) arrange a loan, complete the construction of the road
as quickly as possible and negotiate the sale of the plot. It may hap-
pen that benefits from the last solution (higher price or rent, wider
scope of interested investors, quicker economic development result-
ing in multiple-effects that attract new projects, providing additional
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jobs and tax revenues) are much greater than the cost resulting from
interest payments to the bank.
⋅ Reduction of operational costs. Let us consider another simple exam-
ple. A local public transport company (owned by the city government)
has ten old buses. These vehicles require frequent repairs and con-
sume a lot of fuel. We can replace these buses using current revenues,
but this will allow us to purchase only one new bus every two years.
On the other hand, we could arrange a loan or issue bonds and replace
all the buses at once. What are benefits of the latter solution? Apart
from the comfort of citizens who will travel in the new buses, there
will be a lower consumption of fuel, higher reliability of local trans-
port, savings in the cost of repairs and the employment of service staff,
and other secondary advantages. In fact, costs related to borrowing
may even be less than costs involved in maintaining the old buses for
a longer time.
⋅ Longer projects cost more. Financing from current revenues usual-
ly results in a longer time being required to complete the project. It
leads to higher constant costs and higher total volume of spent
resources.
⋅ Stabilization of required budget resources. The volume of capital
spending in local government units fluctuates from one year to anoth-
er. If we finance capital projects from current revenues, the demand
for resources changes over time as well. In countries in which a large
proportion of local revenues is raised in the form of local taxes, an
irrational fluctuation of local tax rates can result.
⋅ Access to grants from European and other development funds. This
is one more rationale for borrowing, specific to Central and Eastern
European countries. There are several investment grants available for
local authorities, but a necessary condition is to provide matching funds
that usually must equal at least 25% of the total project costs (as in the
case of SAPARD or ISPA projects). Borrowing may be a means of
increasing local capacity to apply for these development grants.
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However, there are also potential hazards related to local govern-
ment borrowing, of both a microeconomic and a macroeconomic nature.
The microeconomic danger is related to the potential for excessive
indebtedness of some local governments, leading to serious difficulties
in repayment of loans and possibly jeopardizing the provision of vital
public services. The macroeconomic limitation is related to the fact that
local governments contribute to the overall level of public debt, which
in turn may have a negative effect on inflation and other important para-
meters of the national economy.
6.2 Why local governments should not borrow 
to cover their operating spending
There is a common agreement that borrowing in order to cover current
expenditures is acceptable only in very rare, specific cases—usually for
very short periods, to cover deficits arising from uneven cash flows with-
in a budgetary year. The most typical arguments for the importance of
maintaining a balanced operating budget can be summarized as follows
(for details see for ex. Dafflon 2002):
⋅ Borrowing on operating spending would lead to an unmanageable
debt burden. It would quickly lead to the rolling of loans (using new
loans to finance the payment of an earlier debt’s service) and to a very
serious problem of excessive indebtedness.
⋅ Using current revenues to cover current costs prevents the local pub-
lic sector from growing beyond its optimal size, which may be defined
here as the fiscal burden that voters/taxpayers agree to bear in order
to finance the desired provision of public goods. Borrowing creates a
short term fiscal illusion, in which the demand for public services
is artificially high because it is distorted by the supply, financed not
by local tax effort but in part by credits, bonds, etc.
⋅ An unbalanced current budget may result in negative macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic consequences, since private investments
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may be crowded out. This could happen for the following reasons:
º Public sector borrowing draws on the pool of limited financial
resources available from local banks etc. Local government bor-
rowers are more attractive to banks than private borrowers, because
giving credits to public entities implies lower risk;
º This competition for borrowing from the public sector exerts an
upward pressure on the interest rate, making private investments
more costly;
º Increasing budget deficits negatively affect expectations on infla-
tion, which add more to the upward trend in interest rates.
It is worth noting that when local governments offer loans in order to
finance investments, this negative “crowding-out” consequence does
not occur (assuming that the current account includes debt service),
unless someone postulates that public investments are less productive
then private ones.
6.3 External regulations on local borrowing
Is regulation on local government debt necessary? It may be argued that
it is enough to rely on financial market discipline. This line of argument
would suggest that the adoption of legal rules might be redundant since
tighter credit market conditions—in particular, higher interest rates—
would already impose effective sanctions. If the total debt of local gov-
ernments in the country grows too high, this will indeed be the case.
Also, banks will be unwilling to provide credit or will demand higher
interest from those municipalities that borrow more than they can carry
out effectively. The same will happen if local governments try to issue
bonds—the rating will be low and the market will refuse to buy them
or will demand a very high interest premium.
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Dafflon (2002) suggests, however, that in practice there are several
doubtful assumptions behind the arguments presented in the previous
paragraph.
One such assumption is related to the adequacy of the information
possessed by lenders.
Another practical observation is that lenders usually assume that no
real risk exists in case of local government default. They believe that
someone else (the state?) will eventually pay the debt. Although a local
government bankruptcy is technically possible in several countries, it
is rarely observed in practice because it is so politically unacceptable.
Another doubtful assumption is that the borrower (local govern-
ment) would adequately react to market signals before reaching the
point of exclusion from the credit market.
For these reasons, then, external regulations and control of local bor-
rowing may play a positive role supporting the local credit market.
6.4 Examples of local borrowing and borrowing 
regulations in Western Europe8
In most West-European countries, borrowing to cover operating expen-
ditures is prohibited. Such is the case, for example, in Austria, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. This general rule is not always very strictly followed.
However, if it happens that in practice a deficit on the current account
occurs, the local government is obliged to pay it back within one year
(as in Denmark), or a maximum of two years (Norway). Interesting is
the case of Switzerland, where cantons may decide upon a compulso-
ry increase in the municipal tax rate, if a deficit occurs and the munic-
ipality does nothing to avoid it. 
In general there are two modes of borrowing regulations found in
European countries:
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(1)control of borrowing (including individual borrowing limits and per-
missions), and
(2)control of the level of indebtedness and control of the current bud-
get (which must include resources for servicing debt on capital pro-
jects).
Countries using the former method include:
º Denmark—where the basic principle says that any local borrow-
ing is prohibited, but so many exceptions to this rule exist that in
practice the situation is not significantly different from most other
countries;
º The United Kingdom—which provides a model of administrative
ceiling for borrowing, with each local government receiving an
individual borrowing limit;
º Switzerland—where every capital project which cannot be cov-
ered from the annual budget goes to local referendum. Taking a
credit for an investment requires approval from the canton.
Countries using the latter method include:
º Germany—where the municipality is required to demonstrate that
borrowing will not lead to current deficit due to a planned repay-
ment within the next four years;
º France—where the central government lifted almost all forms of
a priori control by the state administration during the decentral-
ization reform of the 1980s. The law protects local governments
from bankruptcy, so the risk for banks is low. The prefect checks
the legality of local borrowing every year, and if it is not in accor-
dance with the law, such a case is passed to the Regional Audit
Chamber (Chambre Regionale des Comptes). The ratio of debt to
current budget surplus has to be lower than the rate of debt to
annual repayment, which means that the current surplus has to
be higher than annual debt repayment;
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º Italy—where local borrowing is a relatively new phenomenon.
Until 1985 local investments were almost entirely financed by cen-
tral government, and from 1986 to1992 the role of central gov-
ernment was still dominant. Currently, the burden of local invest-
ments is to a large extent carried by local borrowing. There is a
limitation that interest and capital payments in municipalities can-
not exceed 25% of current revenues;
º Spain—where long-term borrowing requires the approval of the
Ministry of Finance only if total debt exceeds 110% of annual cur-
rent revenues or if there was a negative balance in the current bud-
get during the previous year. Approval from the Ministry of Finance
is also required for bonds or indebtedness in foreign currencies.
Where do West-European local governments go to borrow money? First
of all, unlike the American (US or Canadian) model, taking bank credits
is much more common than issuing bonds, although the latter method
has been increasingly popular during the last few years in Europe as well.
A good illustration of this fact is the number of ratings of local govern-
ments presented in a recent publication of one of the leading rating agen-
cies, Standards and Poors (Local and Regional…, 2002).9 The publica-
tion includes a list of rated local governments (below the regional tier).The
numbers show 28 in Canada alone, 51 in the whole of Western Europe
(the highest numbers are in Italy—fifteen, France—twelve, and Sweden—
twelve), and seventeen in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe (includ-
ing six in Poland, four in the Czech Republic and four in Russia). In 1997
in France, for example, banks lent over 70 billion French franks in the
form of credits to local governments, while the number of bond issues
was just about 5 billion French franks. Bonds are usually considered by
French local governments to be more expensive and less flexible than
bank credits. The situation is similar in other countries, although it should
be noted that issuing bonds has gradually became more “fashionable” dur-
ing the last fifteen to twenty years. In Italy, issuing bonds has been pos-
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sible since 1990, and some big cities (such as Rome, Naples and Turin)
as well as regions (Sicily) decided to use this form of project finance. Bank
credits are still the main method used in Italy, however.
A significant bond issue (especially one located on international mar-
kets) requires a rating from one of the major rating agencies, such as
Standard & Poors, Moody, or Fitch. The rating is a uniform, standard
assessment of credit worthiness. The scale of rating is usually from AAA
(the highest quality) to D (which means default). In Standard & Poor,
methodology grades between AAA and BBB- mean investment grades,
while those between BB+ and C- are considered speculative. Table 2
provides recent examples of ratings for local and national governments
in Eastern and Western Europe.
If bank credit is a main borrowing method, the next question is
whether there are special institutions or special lines of financing avail-
able to local governments, perhaps with subsidized interest rates. Or,
are cities and regions simply to go through the normal procedures in
commercial banks? The practice in this respect varies from one coun-
try to another, but the general trend in recent years has been a dimin-
ishing of the role of special borrowing institutions for local governments
and an increase in co-operation with commercial banks.
In practice, the bulk of local indebtedness is found in the biggest
cities. In Spain, most local debt has been produced by big cities. Six
cities having over half a million citizens are responsible for one-third of
the total local debt. Together with cities of over 200 thousand, their
debt is well over half of all indebtedness of local governments. Similar
observations have been reported in France, the United Kingdom and
Germany, where the most indebted local government is the city of Frank-
furt with a debt of almost 10,000 deutsche marks per capita in 1994
(Farber 2002). The same is true in several countries of Central Europe.
In Poland at the end of 2000, the level of debt was just over 10% of
annual revenues in local governments with fewer than 5,000 citizens,
but almost 20% in cities of over 50,000. In Slovakia, differences were
45
even more spectacular — in villages of fewer than 500 inhabitants debt
was just 1.3% of annual revenues, but in cities of over 50,000 it was
7.9%. In cities with over 100,000, the number was a staggering 48.6%.
(Kling, Niznansky, Pilat 2002). In the Czech Republic, as well, the debt
of the three largest cities (Prague, Brno and Ostrava) constituted over a
half of the total local government indebtedness at the end of 2000!
Table 2. Examples of ratings of national and local governments in East-Central
and Western Europe (by Standard & Poors, long-term international rating, 
February 2002)
Source: Local and Regional Government, February (2002).
State Grade City Grade
Central and Eastern Europe
Slovenia A Brno (CZ) A-
Czech Republic A- Olomunc (CZ) A-
Estonia A- Ostrava (CZ) A-
Hungary A- Praha (CZ) A-
Poland BBB+ Kraków (PL) BBB+
Latvia BBB Gdañsk (PL) BBB
Croatia BBB- Lódz (PL) BBB
Lithuania BBB- Szczecin (PL) BBB
Bulgaria BB- Wroclaw (PL) BBB
Romania B Bydgoszcz (PL) BBB-
Ukraine B Riga (LT) BBB
Zagreb (HR) BBB-
Sofia (BG) BB
St Petersburg (RU) B+
Sverdlovsk (RU) CCC+
Irkuck (RU) CCC+
EU Countries
Denmark AAA Vienna (A) AAA
Italy AA Paris (F) AAA
Portugal AA Brussels (B) AA
Stockholm (S) AA
Naples (I) BBB
Avignon (F) BBB-
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The recent regulations of the Maastricht stabilization pact related
to the introduction of a “Euro zone” have brought a new element into
discussions on local indebtedness. The Masstricht agreement limits the
overall level of public debt to a maximum of 60% of GDP, and also
limits the annual total public budget deficit to 3% of GDP. It should
be noted also that the level of central debt is usually much higher at
the central than at the local level. For example, local debt in Germany
constitutes just above 8% and in Switzerland 19% of the total public
debt. More precise data are presented in figures 3 and 4. As is shown,
except for Luxembourg, in all EU countries the local share in public
debt is much lower than the local share in public spending. Also, in all
fifteen countries, local governments finance the bulk of public invest-
ments. In France, Ireland, Italy and Spain, the local share exceeds two-
thirds.
Figure 3 illustrates that in most EU countries the share of local debt
to GDP is rather low—about 5% on average. The Netherlands and Spain,
with a local debt ratio over 8%, are the only exceptions to this rule. In
eleven out of fifteen EU countries the local debt-to-GDP ratio decreased
between 1995 and 2000.
6.5 Borrowing by local governments in Poland
The borrowing regulations for local governments do not prescribe how
the borrowed funds should be utilized—whether they should be spent
on investments or on current expenditures. However, the size of local
government debt (other than short-term, which needs to be repaid with-
in the same budget year), is limited in the following ways:
º The Polish constitution states that the overall public debt cannot
be higher than 60% of the Gross Domestic Product. If the debt is
larger than 50%, as it may be in 2003, a special limitation applies
which makes new borrowing very difficult;
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Figure 3. Public debt, spending and investments – the role of local governments (2000)
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Ir
el
an
d
Ita
ly
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Source: Local Finance in the Fifteen Countries of the EU, (2002).
local debt as % 
of public debt
local spending as %
of public spending
local investments as% 
of public investments
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
48
Figure 4. Local government debt as % of GDP
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º The overall limit of local government debt cannot be higher than
60% of annual revenues;
º The debt service in a given year cannot exceed 15% of total bud-
get revenues.
As in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the market of com-
munal credits is much less developed than in Western Europe or the
United States. However, in comparison to several other countries of the
region, the market grows very quickly. Unlike some other countries,
such as Bulgaria, Romania or the former Soviet Republics, the existing
local debt in Poland is mostly in the form of bond issues, commercial
bank credits, and preferential loans for housing and ecological projects.
The system is not burdened with significant arrears in payments or with
low-efficiency, inter-budgetary loans.
After the initial period of transition (1990-1995) when, for various
reasons, local governments were very reluctant to borrow money, many
municipalities increased their activity on the capital market. Neverthe-
less, most local governments are still very prudent and the level of debt
is usually far from legal limits. By the end of 2001 the average level of
debt was between 10% (in rural governments) and 23% of annual rev-
enues (in the biggest cities).
Figure 5 illustrates the development of local borrowing in recent
years. In 2001, for the first time, commercial credits were the largest
category of the local debt. Previously, the dominant category was bor-
rowing in the form of preferential loans (with the interest rate signifi-
cantly lower than on the commercial market). These were offered most-
ly by the Environment Protection Fund for ecological investments, such
as waste-water treatment, solid waste disposal and so on. Bonds still
constitute a small but rapidly expanding part of the market.
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7. Autonomy in local financial management 
and service delivery
Financial decentralization depends not only upon allocation of revenues
and local government discretion to decide upon them. Even with these
factors in place, local fiscal autonomy can be limited by strict regula-
tions and control related to spending, financial planning and organiza-
tion of local services.
In some countries, genuine financial decentralization is greatly lim-
ited by the number of standards which require allocation of centrally-
defined resources to various functions. If these norms and standards are
numerous and strict enough, local autonomy in spending policies
remains just an illusion. To a large extent, this is the case of local gov-
ernments in Ukraine, where standards of spending on social services
(such as benefits for war and labor veterans) and health care are extreme-
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ly numerous and hardly take into account the revenue capacity of local
budgets.
A major limitation may also result from central regulation of wages
and salaries of municipal employees. In Poland, in 1999-2000, the cen-
trally-determined increase of teachers’ salaries produced a lot of dis-
turbances in the local financial situation. An alternative solution may
be found in the United Kingdom or Scandinavian countries, where
salaries of local employees are usually negotiated between relevant trade
unions and associations of local governments.
Real autonomy may be also limited if local governments have no
right to set charges for local services. In practice, artificially low fares,
fees or other charges often force municipalities to allocate significant
resources for subsidies to service delivery. A similar effect may limit
decisions on the organizational structure of service delivery units. 
The most important aspect of financial autonomy is local discretion
over the form of municipal service delivery. Local governments should
be free to design the internal structures of municipal administration, to
decide the number of staff employed, and to use alternative forms of
service delivery (private and non-profit organizations) if so desired.
Obviously, local autonomy over these areas is limited by general laws
on competitive tendering, company law and non-profit legislation, tax
laws, etc.
* * *
The length of this booklet does not permit discussion of all the issues
related to local financial decentralization. For example, we do not dis-
cuss issues related to tax administration, budgeting procedures and poli-
cies, or organization of municipal services (which has an important
impact on financial arrangements). It should be noted that an extensive
discussion of some of these issues can be found in other LGI publica-
tions.10
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Nevertheless, the principles and examples presented above, although
presented in a somewhat simplistic manner, may be treated as bench-
marking useful for the analysis of inter-governmental financial arrange-
ments in other transitional countries.
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Notes
1. For a description of the main foundations of fiscal federalism see: Mus-
grave 1957, Oates 1972, King 1984.
2. Only spending of sub-national governments with clearly self-government
status are taken into account on figure 1. Sub-national units which are pri-
marily levels of state administration are left aside. In Ukraine, for example, the
same figure would include spending of villages, towns and cities of oblast sig-
nificance, but not of rayons and oblasts.
3. There are several countries in Central Eastern Europe in which local bud-
gets depend heavily on revenue from personal income tax. Examples are:
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary or Ukraine. But in each of these cases the
system is based on a share in central tax, with no local discretion to regulate
such an income.
4. Note that personal income tax in Poland is residence-based (as opposed
to being based on the place of work); i.e., part of the tax from every citizen
goes to the home local government, not to the local government in which he
or she works.
5. For a detailed review of European grant systems see, for example: Blair
1993, Limitations of Local..., 1998, Local Finance in the Fifteeen…, 2002.
6. For details see “Guides to the Standard Spending Assessments,” published
annually by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.
7. See Monasterio-Escudero, Suarez-Pandiello 2002.
8. Examples quoted in this section are mostly quoted after: Dafflon 2002,
Local Authorites Budgetary…, 1996.
9. A positive rating from one of the major agencies is usually a pre-condi-
tion for the issuing of major bonds.
10. For a discussion of local tax administration see Hogye 2000; for bud-
geting see Hogye 2002; for organization of utility services see Peteri & Hor-
vath 2001; for education management and finances see Davey 2002; for social
services see Tausz 2002, for details of borrowing regulations and practices see
Swianiewicz 2003, forthcoming.
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